Union Of India vs Abhiram Verma on 30 September, 2021


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Supreme Court of India

Union Of India vs Abhiram Verma on 30 September, 2021

Author: M.R. Shah

Bench: M.R. Shah, A.S. Bopanna

                                                              REPORTABLE
                                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                   CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1027 OF 2020


          Union of India and another                               …Appellants


                                        Versus


          Abhiram Verma                                            …Respondent




                                              JUDGMENT

M.R. SHAH, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment

and order dated 9.2.2018 passed by the Learned Armed Forces

Tribunal, Regional Bench, Srinagar at Jammu (hereinafter referred to as

the ‘Tribunal’) in T.A. No. 25/2017(SWP No. 454 of 2008), by which the

learned Tribunal has disposed of the said transfer application by setting
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
Jatinder Kaur

aside para 2 of letter dated 31.01.2007 to the extent it denied
Date: 2021.09.30
16:35:06 IST
Reason:

terminal/pensionary benefits to the respondent herein – original applicant

1
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘respondent’) and directed the appellants –

original respondents to process his claim for terminal/pensionary

benefits taking his qualifying service as 15 years as regards “late

entrant” in terms of Regulation 15 of the Pension Regulations and to

release the same together with arrears, the department – Union of India

and another have preferred the present statutory appeal.

2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under:

That the respondent herein commissioned in the Indian Army

(Armed Medical Corps) as a Short Service Commission Officer on

27.03.1992 for a period of five years at the age of 33 years and 10

months. He voluntarily applied for Permanent Commission on 7.8.1997.

He was granted Permanent Commission at the age of 39 years and 2

months on 28.01.1998. Respondent became a Graded Specialist on

1.6.1994 and thereafter he became a Classified Specialist on 1.6.1999.

By letter/application dated 15.04.2000, the respondent applied for

resignation on the ground of lack of promotional prospects. At this

stage, it is required to be noted that his actual date of superannuation at

56 years of age was 31.05.2014. The application for resignation came

to be rejected by the DG, Medical Services (Army) vide communication

dated 4.9.2000. That thereafter the respondent filed a statutory

complaint on 24.03.2001 against the rejection of his resignation, the

2
same was rejected by the Under Secretary, Government of India on

14.03.2002. That thereafter the respondent filed a writ petition before

the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir being SWP No. 1573/2001 against

the rejection of his complaint by the Under Secretary, Government of

India. The said writ petition came to be allowed by the High Court vide

order dated 11.10.2006 quashing the order of the Under Secretary which

rejected the respondent’s resignation and directed the Army to consider

the case of resignation afresh. That thereafter the respondent’s

resignation came to be accepted vide order/communication dated

31.01.2007, however, it was stated that he was not entitled to any

terminal benefits except for encashment of leave (the denial of the

terminal benefits was the subject matter before the Armed Forces

Tribunal). The name of the respondent was struck off from the Army

Medical Corps vide movement order dated 22.04.2007, with effect from

23.04.2007.

2.1 That thereafter the respondent preferred the writ petition before the

High Court of Jammu & Kashmir being SWP No. 454/2008 for grant of

gratuity and pension, which subsequently came to be transferred to the

Armed Forces Tribunal as TA No. 25/2017. That by the impugned

judgment and order dated 9.2.2018, the learned Tribunal has disposed

of the said transfer application directing the appellants to process the

3
respondent’s claim for terminal/pensionary benefits taking qualifying

service as 15 years as a “late entrant” under Regulation 15 of the

Pension Regulations. That leave to appeal has also been dismissed by

the learned Tribunal vide order dated 25.03.2019.

2.2 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment

and order passed by the learned Tribunal directing the appellants to

process the respondent’s claim for terminal/pensionary benefits taking

qualifying service as 15 years as a “late entrant” under Regulation 15 of

the Pension Regulation, the Union of India and another have preferred

the present appeal.

3. Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned Additional Solicitor General of India

has appeared on behalf of the appellants and Shri Vikas Singh, learned

Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the respondent.

3.1 Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned ASG has vehemently submitted that in

the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Tribunal has

materially erred in directing the appellants to consider the respondent’s

claim for terminal/pensionary benefits taking qualifying service as 15

years as a “late entrant” under Regulation 15 of the Pension

Regulations.

3.2 It is vehemently submitted that as such the learned Tribunal has

wrongly observed that the respondent submitted the request for

4
“voluntary retirement”. It is submitted that as such it was not a case of

“voluntary retirement”, but it was a case of “resignation” by the

respondent on the ground of lack of promotional prospects.

3.3 It is submitted that even it was not the case on behalf of the

respondent before the learned Tribunal that he submitted the application

for “voluntary retirement”. Reliance is placed upon some of the

averments in the petition before the High Court/learned Tribunal in which

he has categorically stated that he tendered the “resignation” for want of

promotional avenues.

3.4 It is submitted that since it was the case of “voluntary resignation

from service”, the respondent shall not be entitled to the benefit as “late

entrant” under Regulation 15 of the Pension Regulations.

3.5 It is submitted that even otherwise at the relevant time the

respondent did not complete the qualifying service for the purpose of

“voluntary retirement”. It is submitted that thus the date on which the

respondent submitted the application for resignation on 15.04.2000, he

was not even eligible for premature retirement. It is submitted that

therefore it was a case of “voluntary resignation” and not “voluntary

retirement”.

3.6 It is submitted that admittedly when the respondent tendered his

resignation on 15.04.2000, he had only rendered service for 15 years

5
and 27 days. It is submitted that had the respondent not voluntarily

resigned and retired at the age of superannuation, (i.e, 56 years for a Lt.

Col.) on 31.05.2014, he would have rendered 22 years 2 months and 2

days of service. It is submitted that therefore when the respondent

tendered the resignation, he did not complete the minimum qualifying

service as per Regulation 25(a), i.e., 20 years. It is submitted that

therefore the respondent took the shelter of Regulation 15 as a “late

entrant”. It is submitted that the minimum qualifying service for being

eligible for retiring pension is 20 years under Regulation 25(a). It is

submitted that it is only in the case of compulsory retirement on attaining

the age of superannuation where it is impossible for the officer to

complete 20 years due to the prescribed age limit that a concession of 5

years is granted to such “late entrants” that can earn a retiring person

even after completion of minimum 15 years of service.

3.7 It is submitted that therefore as it was a case of “voluntary

resignation” and not a case of “voluntary retirement/retirement”. The

respondent cannot be said to be “late entrant” and therefore shall not be

entitled to the benefit under Regulation 15 of the Pension Regulations.

3.8 It is further submitted that in the present case the learned Armed

Forces Tribunal has erred in treating the present case of “voluntary

resignation” as one of “voluntary retirement”. It is submitted that there is

6
a vast difference between the “voluntary resignation” and “voluntary

retirement”. Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case

of BSES Yamuna Power Limited v. Ghanshyam Chand Sharma.

Reported in (2020) 3 SCC 346 (paragraphs 13 & 14).

3.9 It is further submitted by Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned ASG

appearing on behalf of the appellants that assuming for the time being

that the respondent applied for “voluntary retirement”, in that case also,

as on 15.04.2000 even he did not complete the qualifying service for the

purpose of premature retirement.

3.10 Now so far as the case on behalf of the respondent, so stated in

the counter affidavit on the reliance placed upon Regulation 19(h) and

19(j) of the Pension Regulations of the Army, 2008 to contend that the

period of service in a central autonomous body as well as period of ante-

date of commission granted to an officer in respect of possession of a

Post-Graduate Qualification shall also count towards reckonable

pensionable service is concerned, it is submitted that the said

Regulations, 2008 shall not be applicable as the respondent has

resigned in the year 2000 and even his name was struck off from the

Army Medical Corps in the year 2007 and therefore Pension Regulations

1961 shall be applicable. It is submitted that, as such, such a plea was

7
not taken before filing of the counter affidavit before this Court and rightly

not taken as the Pension Regulations 2008 shall not be applicable.

3.11 It is further submitted that even otherwise considering the

applicable rules, namely, Premature Retirement/Resignation from

Service of AMC Officers dated 26.03.1998, if a person has resigned on

the ground of lack of career/promotional prospects the same cannot be a

reason for acceptance of premature retirement/resignation and the

officers who are permitted to resign are not entitled to terminal benefits,

however, they are eligible to avail encashment of accumulated annual

leave. It is submitted that therefore also not only the respondent was

ineligible to take the benefit of Pension Regulation 15, but also was

ineligible for any terminal benefits as per the aforesaid

Regulations/Rules.

3.12 It is further submitted by Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned ASG that

even the observations made by the learned Tribunal that the authority

took seven years to decide on the application submitted by the

respondent is factually incorrect. It is submitted that the respondent

tendered the resignation on 15.04.2000 and the same came to be

rejected by the DG, Medical Services (Army) on 4.9.2000 and even the

respondent filed a statutory complaint against the rejection of the

resignation on 24.03.2001. It is submitted that therefore, as such, there

8
was no delay at all on the part of the authority in deciding the application

for resignation.

3.13. Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid

decision, it is prayed to allow the present appeal.

4. The present appeal is opposed by Shri Vikas Singh, learned

Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.

4.1 It is vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of

the case, as rightly observed by the learned Tribunal, the respondent

shall be entitled to the benefit as “late entrant” under Regulation 15 as

well as the benefit of Regulation 19(h) of Pension Regulations, 2008. It

is submitted that, as such, Regulation 19 of the Pension Regulations,

2008 is pari materia to Pension Regulations, 1961.

4.2 It is submitted that in accordance with Pension Regulations, 2008,

respondent’s pre-commission service as Research Scholar with Gandhi

Medical College, Bhopal (a Government College) and as a Medical

Officer with BHEL, totalling to 6 years 4 months and 6 days should also

be counted towards his total qualifying pensionable service. It is

submitted that thus the respondent’s total qualifying pensionable service

comes to 22 years 11 months and 2 days (15 years 27 days of Army

Service + 6 years 4 months and 6 days of pre-commission service + 1

and half years of ante-date seniority).

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4.3 It is further submitted that even otherwise the learned Tribunal

treated the respondent’s case as a “late entrant” in the peculiar facts and

circumstances as mentioned in para 4 of the impugned judgment which

read as under:

i) As admitted by the appellants, respondent was granted PC at a

late age of 39 years 2 months, in the organizational interest, to meet the

acute shortage of medical-specialist in the Army prevailing at that point

of time, thereby relaxing the maximum age limit 32 years;

ii) Over a period of time, the medical specialists became surplus in

Army thereby causing acute stagnation in the promotions/career

progression and lack of opportunity to do in-house specialist courses,

which prompted the respondent to seek pre-mature release from the

Army so as to establish his career elsewhere at that young age;

iii) the respondent was 42 years of age when he had applied for the

pre-mature severance on 15.04.2000, which was initially rejected by the

Appellants on the false ground that there was shortage of medical

specialists in the Army; and

iv) the appellants inordinately delayed in accepting respondent’s

request which happened only with the kind indulgence of the J&K High

Court and accordingly by the time respondent was released from the

10
Army, he had already crossed the age of 49 years of age which was too

late to establish his practice or start a new career.

4.4 It is further submitted by Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel

that, as such, Pension Regulations, 2008 shall be applicable. It is

submitted that as held by this Court in the cases of D.S. Nakara v. Union

of India (1983) 1 SCC 305 and K.J.S Buttar v. Union of India, (2011) 11

SCC 429 for the purpose of granting benefit under the new Pension

Rules, the date of retirement is irrelevant, though the revised scheme

would be operative from the date mentioned in the new Pension Rules

but would bring its umbrella even to the pensioners who retired after the

specified date w.e.f. and their pension would be payable accordingly with

effect from the said specific date.

4.5 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Union of

India v. Lt. Col. P.S. Bhargava, (1997) 2 SCC 28 (Paras 7, 18 to 20), it is

submitted that as held by this Court in the context of Army, there is no

difference between “resignation” and “voluntary retirement” because in

either case prior permission of the government would be required for an

Army Personnel to leave the service. It is submitted that this Court also

held that the policy letter issued by the Army Headquarter, thereby

denying pension and other terminal benefits to the persons who resigned

11
to the service cannot be given effect to being contrary to the Pension

Regulations which does not have such stipulation.

4.6 It is submitted that even otherwise the respondent had submitted

his application on 15.04.2000 on a printed form prescribed by the

appellants which has both options of “resignation” and “premature

retirement” printed on it. It is submitted that as such the respondent’s

real intention was to seek premature retirement but he was told that

since he had less than 10 years of service at that point of time, as per

para 7 & 13 of the Army HQ Policy dated 26.03.1998, the premature

release before 10 years of service has to be termed as “resignation” and

not as “premature retirement”. It is submitted therefore his application

was treated as one of “resignation” and not as “premature retirement”

due to the aforesaid technical reason, even though the respondent has

no intention to resign and thereby losing his service benefits, if any.

4.7 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid

decisions, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal.

5. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel for the respective

parties at length.

The short question posed for the consideration of this Court is,

whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondent is

12
entitled to the benefit of Regulation 15 of Pension Regulations, 1961 as

a “late entrant” and therefore entitled to the pensionary benefits?

The incidental question which is posed for the consideration of this

Court is, whether the resignation tendered by the respondent on

15.04.2000 can be said to be a “resignation” or “voluntary retirement”.

5.1 While considering the aforesaid issues, even at the cost of

repetition, few dates and events are required to be considered, which

are as under:

i) the respondent applied for resignation (now according to the

respondent it was a request for voluntary retirement) on the ground of

lack of promotional aspects on 15.04.2000;

ii) the application for resignation came to be rejected by the DG,

Medical Services (Army) on 4.9.2000;

iii) the respondent filed a statutory complaint against the rejection of

his resignation on 24.03.2001;

iv) the respondent’s statutory complaint came to be rejected by the

Under Secretary, Government of India on 14.03.2002;

v) the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir by judgment and order dated

11.10.2006 quashed the order of the Under Secretary who rejected the

13
respondent’s resignation and consequently directed the department to

consider the case of the resignation afresh;

vi) respondent’s resignation came to be accepted in pursuance of the

High Court’s order vide communication/letter dated 31.01.2007,

however, it was stated that the respondent is not entitled to any terminal

benefits except for encashment of leave;

vii) the name of the respondent came to be struck off from the Army

Medical Corps vide Movement Order w.e.f. 23.4.2007;

viii) as per paras 7 & 13 of the Army HQ Policy dated 26.3.1998, the

qualifying service for the purpose of premature retirement was 10 years

of service, otherwise his application has to be termed as “resignation”;

ix) admittedly the respondent did not complete the ten years of

service on 15.04.2000 when he tendered his resignation and therefore

as such was not eligible to apply for “voluntary retirement”;

x) when the respondent tendered application for resignation on

15.04.2000, the respondent rendered service for 15 years and 27 days

only; and

xi) the minimum period of qualifying service actually rendered for

earning retiring pension shall be 20 years as per Regulation 25(a),

however, if an officer is a “late entrant” who, as such, has rendered

14
service at least for 15 years and who has retired on reaching the

prescribed age limit for compulsory retirement with at least 15 years

commissioned service (actual) as per regulation 15.

6. To bring the case within Regulation 15 and get the benefit as a

“late entrant”, it is the case on behalf of the respondent that his

application tendered on 15.04.2000 was not an application for

“resignation”, but it was a request for “voluntary retirement”. The

submission on behalf of the respondent that what was tendered on

15.04.2000 was not an application for “resignation” but it was an

application for “voluntary retirement” has no substance and cannot be

accepted for the following reasons:

i) that the qualifying service for the purpose of “voluntary retirement”

is minimum 10 years’ service. On 15.04.2000, the respondent did not

complete 10 years of service and therefore was not eligible for applying

for “voluntary retirement” and therefore on 15.04.2000 otherwise also he

could not have applied for “voluntary retirement”;

ii) in the application dated 15.04.2000, the cause shown was lack of

promotional aspects. Even the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir in its

judgment and order dated 11.10.2006 which was filed by the respondent

specifically noted the submission on behalf of the respondent that the

“petitioner having joined the Commission at a later stage has no chance

15
of promotion to the first selection, i.e., to the rank of Colonel in the Army

Medical Corps. Petitioner moved an application dated 15 th April, 2000

before the respondents’ seeking “resignation” from the army on the

ground of non-availability of promotional prospects and ineligibility to

acquire technical skill”. Even the High Court in its judgment and order

dated 11.10.2006 treated and considered the application submitted by

the respondent dated 15.04.2000 as application for “resignation” and

proceeded on that footing. Even the subsequent petition filed before the

High Court being SWP 454/2008, the respondent never contended that it

was an application for “voluntary retirement”. If we see the averments in

the writ petition all throughout the word used by the respondent is

“resignation”. Therefore, only as an afterthought and to get the benefit of

“late entrant” under Regulation 15, now it is the case on behalf of the

respondent that what was meant by him at that time was praying for

“voluntary retirement” and it was not an application for “resignation”;

iii) even as per the applicable rules for premature

retirement/resignation of AMC Officers dated 26.3.1998, a request of an

officer to seek premature retirement/resignation on the ground of lack of

career prospects shall not be accepted and even if the officers are

permitted to resign, they are not entitled to terminal/pensionary benefits;

and

16

iv) even from para 6 of the written submissions dated 15.09.2021 filed

on behalf of the respondent, it can be seen that the respondent has

accepted that on 15.04.2000 he was not eligible for “voluntary

retirement” and therefore he used the word “resignation” to get out of the

technical reason. Therefore, it can be said that he has admitted that on

15.04.2000 he did not fulfil the criteria for “voluntary retirement” as on

that day he had not completed 10 years of service.

Therefore, from the aforesaid facts, the only conclusion would be

that on 15.04.2000 the respondent tendered “resignation” for lack of

promotional avenues/aspects and it was not a case of “voluntary

retirement”.

7. Even, there is a distinction between the “resignation” and

“voluntary retirement”. A person can resign at any time during his

service, however, an officer cannot ask for premature/voluntary

retirement unless he fulfils the eligibility criteria.

8. This Court had an occasion to consider the distinction between

“resignation” and “voluntary retirement” in the case of Senior Divisional

Manager, LIC v. Shree Lal Meena, reported in (2019) 4 SCC 479, which

has been subsequently followed by this Court in the case of BSES

Yamuna Power Ltd. (supra). In paragraph 22, it is observed and held as

under:

17
“22. The principles in the context of the controversy before us are well
enunciated in the judgment of this Court in RBI v. Cecil Dennis
Solomon [RBI v. Cecil Dennis Solomon, (2004) 9 SCC 461: 2004 SCC
(L&S) 737]. On a similar factual matrix, the employees had resigned
sometime in 1988. The RBI Pension Regulations came in operation in
1990. The employees who had resigned earlier sought applicability of
these Pension Regulations to themselves. The provisions, once again, had
a similar clause of forfeiture of service, on resignation or dismissal or
termination. The relevant observations are as under: (SCC pp. 467-68,
paras 10)

“10. In service jurisprudence, the expressions “superannuation”,
“voluntary retirement”, “compulsory retirement” and “resignation” convey
different connotations. Voluntary retirement and resignation involve
voluntary acts on the part of the employee to leave service. Though
both involve voluntary acts, they operate differently. One of the basic
distinctions is that in case of resignation it can be tendered at any time,
but in the case of voluntary retirement, it can only be sought for after
rendering prescribed period of qualifying service. Other fundamental
distinction is that in case of the former, normally retiral benefits are
denied but in case of the latter, the same is not denied. In case of the
former, permission or notice is not mandated, while in case of the latter,
permission of the employer concerned is a requisite condition. Though
resignation is a bilateral concept, and becomes effective on acceptance
by the competent authority, yet the general rule can be displaced by
express provisions to the contrary….”

8.1 The law laid down by this Court in the case of Shree Lal Meena

(supra) has been reiterated by this Court in the subsequent decision in

the case of BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. (supra) and in the subsequent

decision, this Court also considered the observations made in paragraph

26 in Shree Lal Meena (supra) that while pension schemes do form

beneficial legislation in a delegated form, a beneficial construction

cannot run contrary to the express terms of the provisions. It is further

observed that the issue cannot be dealt with on a charity principle.

When the legislature, in its wisdom, brings forth certain beneficial

18
provisions in the form of Pension Regulations from a particular date and

on particular terms and conditions, aspects which are excluded cannot

be included in it by implication. Therefore, having tendered the

“resignation”, the respondent has to suffer the consequences and now

cannot be permitted to take ‘U’ turn and say that what the respondent

wanted was “premature retirement” and not “resignation”.

9. Now so far as the reliance placed by the respondent on Regulation

19(h) and 19(j) of the Pension Regulations of the Army, 2008 to contend

that a period of service in a central autonomous body as well as period

of ante-date of commission granted to an officer in respect of possession

of a Post-Graduate Qualification shall also be counted for the purpose of

pensionable service, the same cannot be accepted, firstly on the ground

that the same was not raised before the High Court/AFT. Even

otherwise also, the Pension Regulations of the Army, 2008 shall not be

applicable to the case of the respondent as the respondent would be

governed by the Pension Regulations, 1961, which have no pari materia

provisions like Regulation 19(h) and 19(j) of the Pension Regulations of

the Army, 2008. The same has no retrospective applicability. As such,

the respondent had resigned on 15.04.2000 and even his resignation

was accepted on 31.01.2007, much prior to the coming into force of the

Pension Regulations of the Army, 2008.

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10. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of this Court

in the cases of D.S. Nakara (supra) and K.J.S. Buttar (supra) is

concerned, the same shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on

hand. Similarly, the decision of this Court in the case of Lt. Col. P.S.

Bhargava (supra) shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand

and/or the same shall not be of any assistance to the respondent. In the

case before this Court, it was found that the officer completed the

requisite qualifying service which was for the purpose of pensionable

benefits. However, the same was sought to be denied on the ground

that he voluntarily resigned. In the present case, as observed

hereinabove, the minimum qualifying service for the purpose of

pensionable benefits is 20 years as per Regulation 25(a) and if his case

is considered as a “late entrant”, then 15 years as per Regulation 15.

11. In light of the above findings, it is required to be considered

whether the respondent can be said to be a “late entrant” and is entitled

to the benefit of Regulation 15 as a “late entrant” and the pensionable

benefits or not? Regulation 15 reads as under:

“Regulation 15 – Late Entrants

15. For purposes of the regulations in this Chapter, a “late entrant” is
an officer who is retired on reaching the prescribed age limit for
compulsory retirement with at least 15 years commissioned service
(actual) qualifying for pension but whose total qualifying service is less
than twenty years (actual).”

20
As per Regulation 15, a “late entrant” is an officer who is retired on

reaching the prescribed age limit for compulsory retirement with at least

15 years commissioned service (actual). As the respondent did not

retire on reaching the prescribed age limit for compulsory retirement, the

respondent cannot be said to be a “late entrant”. The purpose and

object seems to be to give 5 years relaxation/grace for qualifying service

for earning a retiring pension. As per Regulation 25(a), the minimum

period of qualifying service actually rendered and required for earning a

retiring pension shall be 20 years. However, if an officer is not able to

complete the minimum period of qualifying service, i.e., 20 years and

before completing 20 years of service he is attaining the age of

superannuation and is retired on reaching the prescribed age limit of

compulsory retirement, but has completed 15 years of qualifying service,

he is considered as a “late entrant” and is entitled to pensionary benefits

by getting 5 years grace period. Therefore, to that extent the same can

be said to be a relaxation/grace of 5 years for getting the benefit of

pensionable benefits provided the case falls within Regulation 15 and an

officer is a “late entrant”. As observed hereinabove, the respondent

cannot be said to be a “late entrant” and therefore not entitled to the

benefit of Regulation 15 and therefore not entitled to the pensionary

benefits.

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12. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present

appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the

learned Armed Forces Tribunal dated 9.2.2018 in T.A. No. 25/2017

quashing and setting aside para 2 of letter dated 31.01.2007 to the

extent it denied terminal/pensionary benefits to the respondent and

directing the appellants to process the respondent’s claim for

terminal/pensionary benefits taking his qualifying service as 15 years as

regards “late entrant” in terms of Regulation 15 of the Pension

Regulations is hereby quashed and set aside and it is held that the

respondent is not entitled to the terminal/pensionary benefits as a “late

entrant” in terms of Regulation 15 of the Pension Regulations. The

present appeal is allowed accordingly, however, in the facts and

circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

………………………………..J.

                                         [M.R. SHAH]


NEW DELHI;                               ……………………………….J.
SEPTEMBER 30, 2021.                      [A.S. BOPANNA]




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