Nagendra Sah vs The State Of Bihar on 14 September, 2021


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Supreme Court of India

Nagendra Sah vs The State Of Bihar on 14 September, 2021

Author: Ajay Rastogi

Bench: Ajay Rastogi, Abhay S. Oka

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                                                                     NON-REPORTABLE


                                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1903 OF 2019




             NAGENDRA SAH                                         ……      APPELLANT
                                                 v.
             THE STATE OF BIHAR                                   …… RESPONDENT


                                            JUDGEMENT

ABHAY S. OKA, J.

1. The appellant is the accused. The appellant was prosecuted for the

offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (for short ‘I.P.C.’). The learned Ad hoc Additional Sessions

Judge-III, Bagah, West Champaran by his Judgement and Order dated

29th August 2013 convicted the appellant for both the offences. The

appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine

of Rs.5,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. In
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
default of payment of fine, he was directed to undergo rigorous
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2021.09.14
15:42:45 IST
Reason:

imprisonment for three months. For the offences punishable under Section
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201 of I.P.C, he was directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three

years and to pay a fine of Rs 5,000/-. In default of payment of fine, he was

directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. The learned

Sessions Judge directed that both the sentences shall run concurrently.

2. Being aggrieved by the verdict of the learned Adhoc Additional

Sessions Judge, the appellant preferred an appeal before the High Court

of Judicature at Patna. A Division Bench of Patna High Court by the

impugned Judgment and Order dated 22nd April 2019 dismissed the appeal

preferred by the appellant and upheld the judgment of the learned

Sessions Judge.

3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid two verdicts, the appellant has

preferred the present appeal.

THE PROSECUTION CASE

4. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that on 18 th November 2011, it

was reported that the appellant’s wife died due to burn injuries. On the

basis of the information furnished by one Shri Mahesh Sah, Unnatural

Death Case (for short “U.D. case”) was registered on the same day. On

18th November 2011, autopsy was done by PW No.9 Dr. Ashok Kumar

Tiwari. According to the post-mortem report, the cause of death was

‘asphyxia due to pressure around neck by hand and blunt substance’. On

the basis of the directions of a senior police officer, P.W.No.10 Shri Rajan

Kumar Pandey registered First Information Report on 25 th August 2012. At
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that time, he was posted as the Officer-in-Charge of Gobardhana Police

Station, District West Champaran. The First Information Report was

registered for the offence punishable under section 302 of IPC. After the

case was committed to the Court of Sessions, a charge under Section 201

of IPC was added. Charges for the offences punishable under Sections

302 and 201 of IPC were framed against the appellant.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL

5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-accused submitted

that none of the witnesses except the official witnesses have supported the

prosecution case and that the conviction of the appellant is based solely

on the cause of death mentioned in the post-mortem report. He pointed out

that the testimony of PW Nos.1 to 5 has been already discarded by the

learned Sessions Judge. He submitted that except for the post-mortem

report, no other material has been relied upon by the Trial Court as well as

High Court for convicting the appellant. He placed reliance on a decision of

this Court in the case of Balaji Gunthu Dhule v. State of Maharashtra1 in

support of his submissions.

6. He submitted that the evidence of prosecution witnesses brings on

record an important fact that when the incident constituting the alleged

offence occurred, there were other members of the family of the appellant-

accused present in the house. He submitted that the prosecution

witnesses have deposed that the appellant and the deceased were leading
1 (2012) 11 SCC 685
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a normal matrimonial life. He submitted that PW No.5, Smt. Chandrakali

Devi, who is the mother of the deceased, has not supported prosecution.

She stated in the deposition that the incident of fire took place when the

deceased was boiling milk for her child. He pointed out that even PW

No.5-a, Shri Mahesh Sah who gave a report of unnatural death on 18 th

November 2011 did not support the prosecution. He submitted that a

complete chain of events establishing the guilt of the appellant-accused

has not been established. He urged that though post-mortem report was

available on 18th November 2011, First Information Report was registered

belatedly on 25th August 2012. He would, therefore, submit that the

conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained and deserves to be set

aside.

7. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent – the State of

Bihar submitted that the defence of the appellant that the deceased died to

burn injuries sustained by an accidental fire was proved to be completely

false as can be seen from the post-mortem report and the deposition of

PW No.9, Dr. Ashok Kumar Tiwari, who conducted the autopsy. He pointed

out that PW No.9 categorically stated that the death was due to asphyxia.

He submitted that admittedly the appellant and the deceased were

staying together under the same roof and therefore, Section 106 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short ‘the Evidence Act’) will apply. He

submitted that the burden was on the appellant-accused to explain how

the death has occurred. He submitted that according to the accused, the
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death occurred due to accidental burn injuries. He submitted that the said

plea is found to be false as burn injuries have not caused the death. He

urged that the evidence of PW No.9 shows that the burn injuries on the

person of the deceased were not ante-mortem. He submitted that a chain

of circumstances was established by the prosecution against the accused

which supports only one hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant. He

submitted that the failure of the appellant to discharge the burden on him

under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is very crucial as the case is based

on circumstantial evidence.

CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

8. We have given careful consideration to the submissions. The

prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence. The learned

Sessions Judge, in paragraph 12 of his judgment, has set out various facts

which according to him constituted a complete chain of circumstances

against the accused. The following circumstances were set out by the

learned Trial Judge: –

a) It is an admitted position that the deceased-wife and the appellant-
accused were residing together at the time of her death and
requisite privacy was available to the appellant to perpetrate the
crime;

b) the post-mortem report and the evidence of PW No.9 has
established that the deceased died on account of throttling of her
neck;

c) The burn injuries are undoubtedly ante post-mortem injuries;

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d) The accused tried to mislead the Court by taking a false plea that
the death of the deceased was due to burn injuries; and

e) The prosecution showed fairness by implicating only the appellant
and not his family members.

The learned Sessions Judge held that the aforesaid chain of

circumstances is consistent only with one hypothesis. The said hypothesis

is of the guilt of the accused. The High Court concurred with the said

finding.

9. It is necessary to refer to the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

There were total 11 witnesses examined by the prosecution. PW Nos. 1 to

4 are the neighbours of the accused. None of them are eye witnesses to

the actual incident. PW No.1, Shri Chandradeo Mahto stated that while

the deceased was boiling milk for her child, the leaves lying nearby caught

fire due to which her saree caught fire. He stated that one Shri Chandrika

Prasad, the father-in-law of the deceased attempted to put out the fire and

he sustained burn injuries while doing so. In the cross-examination, he

stated the deceased has good relations with the family of her in-laws.

PW No.2, Shri Jaggu Yadav deposed on the lines of PW No.1. In addition,

he stated that a tempo was called and the appellant, his father and brother

took the deceased to a hospital at Ram Nagar by putting her in the tempo.

The witness deposed that he learnt later on that the deceased died on the

way. In the cross-examination, he accepted that there was never any

dispute between the appellant and his deceased wife.
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10. PW No.3, Shri Kisarmas Mahto stated that when he reached the

house of the appellant, he saw that all the members of the family of the

appellant were putting out the fire. He stated that thereafter the appellant

took the deceased to a hospital at Ram Nagar and on the way, the

deceased died. PW No.4 is Shri Prem Yadav who also stated that on

alarm, he also rushed to the house of the deceased when he saw

Chandrika Prasad, the father of the appellant extinguishing the fire. In the

cross-examination, he deposed that the married life of the appellant and

the deceased was very happy and prosperous and that they have three

children from the wedlock.

11. PW No.5 is Smt. Chandrakali Devi, the mother of the deceased. She

also came out with the version that while her daughter was boiling milk for

her child, her saree caught fire from the lamp due to which she suffered

burn injuries which resulted in her death. In the cross-examination, she

stated that there was no complaint made by her daughter against the

appellant. PW No.5-a is Shri Mahesh Sah. He is the real brother of the

deceased. He accepted in the cross examination that marital life of his

sister was happy and prosperous.

12. PW No.6 Shri Vijay Kumar Gupta, is a formal witness who signed

the death inquest report. PW No.7 Shri Prem Sah is also a signatory to

the death inquest report. In the cross-examination, he admitted that his

house is towards the west side behind the house of the appellant. He
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stated that when alarm was raised about the fire, he noticed that in-laws of

the deceased were extinguishing the fire.

13. PW No.8 is one Shri Devendra Prasad who produced post-mortem

register before the Sessions Court. PW No.9 is Dr. Ashok Kumar Tiwari

who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased on 18 th

November 2011. Apart from proving the post-mortem report in his

evidence, he deposed that the cause of death was “asphyxia due to

pressure around neck by hand and blunt substance”.

14. PW No.10 is Shri Rajan Kumar Pandey who was the Officer-in-

Charge of the police station at Gobardhana at the relevant time. On 25 th

August 2012, the First Information Report was registered by him.

PW No.11 is Shri Deokant Tripathi who was holding the post of Sub-

Inspector at the said police station on 25th August 2012. He carried out

investigation into the offence.

15. As can be seen from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the

in-laws of the deceased were very much staying in the same premises

where the appellant and deceased were staying. PW No.1 stated that he

saw the father-in-law of the deceased extinguishing the fire. The learned

Trial Judge has specifically discarded the testimony of PW Nos.1 to 5. But

PW No.6 Shri Vijay Kumar Gupta stated that he noticed that family

members of the accused were extinguishing the fire. The evidence

adduced by the prosecution shows that at the time of the alleged incident,
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there were other members of the family of the accused with the accused in

his house. However, it is not even the case of the prosecution that the

relationship between the appellant and his deceased wife was strained or

that the relationship between the deceased wife and the appellant’s

parents was strained. On the contrary, some of the prosecution witnesses

have stated that their relationship was cordial.

16. As the entire case is based on circumstantial evidence, we may

make a useful reference to a leading decision of this Court on the subject.

In the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra2, in

paragraph 153, this Court has laid down five golden principles

(Panchsheel) which govern a case based only on circumstantial evidence.

Paragraph 153 reads thus : –

“153. A close analysis of this decision would show
that the following conditions must be fulfilled before
a case against an accused can be said to be fully
established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated
that the circumstances concerned ‘must or
should’ and not ‘may be’ established. There is
not only a grammatical but a legal distinction
between ‘may be proved’ and “must be or should
be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra

where the following observations were made:

Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused
must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can

2 (1984) 4 SCC 116.

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convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and
‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure
conclusions.

(2) The facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused, that is to say, they should not be
explainable on any other hypothesis except that
the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground
for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the
accused.”
(emphasis added)

Paragraphs 158 to 160 of the said decision are also

relevant which read thus :

“158. It may be necessary here to notice a very forceful
argument submitted by the Additional Solicitor-General
relying on a decision of this Court in Deonandan Mishra
v. State of Bihar
, to supplement his argument that if the
defence case is false it would constitute an additional link
so as to fortify the prosecution case. With due respect to
the learned Additional Solicitor-General we are unable to
agree with the interpretation given by him of the aforesaid
case, the relevant portion of which may be extracted thus:

But in a case like this where the various links as
started above have been satisfactorily made out and
the circumstances point to the appellant as the
probable assailant, with reasonable definiteness and
in proximity to the deceased as regards time and
situation, . . . such absence of explanation or false
explanation would itself be an additional link which
completes the chain.”

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159. It will be seen that this Court while taking
into account the absence of explanation or a false
explanation did hold that it will amount to be an
additional link to complete the chain but these
observations must be read in the light of what this
Court said earlier, viz., before a false explanation
can be used as additional link, the following
essential conditions must be satisfied :
(1) various links in the chain of evidence led by the
prosecution have been satisfactorily proved,
(2) the said circumstance points to the guilt of the
accused with reasonable definiteness, and
(3) the circumstance is in proximity to the time and
situation.

160. If these conditions are fulfilled only then a court
can use a false explanation or a false defence as an
additional link to lend an assurance to the court and
not otherwise. On the facts and circumstances of the
present case, this does not appear to be such a case.
This aspect of the matter was examined in Shankarlal
case where this Court observed thus:

Besides, falsity of defence cannot take the place of
proof of facts which the prosecution has to establish in
order to succeed. A false plea can at best be considered
as an additional circumstance, if other circumstances
point unfailingly to the guilt of the accused.”

(emphasis added)

17. In this case, as mentioned above, neither the prosecution witnesses

have deposed to that effect nor any other material has been placed on

record to show that the relationship between the appellant and the

deceased was strained in any manner. Moreover, the appellant was not

the only person residing in the house where the incident took place and it

is brought on record that the parents of the appellant were also present on

the date of the incident in the house. The fact that other members of the

family of the appellant were present shows that there could be another
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hypothesis which cannot be altogether excluded. Therefore, it can be said

that the facts established do not rule out the existence of any other

hypothesis. The facts established cannot be said to be consistent only with

one hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant.

18. Now we come to the argument of the prosecution based on Section

106 of the Evidence Act. Section 106 reads thus :-

“106. Burden of proving fact especially within
knowledge. – When any fact is especially within the
knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact
is upon him.

Illustrations

(a) When a person does an act with some intention other
than that which the character and circumstances of the
act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon
him.

(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a
ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on
him.”

19. Under Section 101 of the Evidence Act, whoever desires any Court

to give a judgment as to a liability dependent on the existence of facts, he

must prove that those facts exist. Therefore, the burden is always on the

prosecution to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable

doubt. Thus, Section 106 constitutes an exception to Section 101. On the

issue of applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, there is a classic

decision of this Court in the case of Shambu Nath Mehra v. The State of
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Ajmer3 which has stood the test of time. The relevant part of the said

decision reads thus :-

“Section 106 is an exception to section 101. Section 101
lays down the general rule about the burden of proof.
“Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any
legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts
which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist”.
Illustration (a) says-

“A desires a Court to give judgment that B shall be
punished for a crime which A says B has committed.

A must prove that B has committed the crime”.
This lays down the general rule that in a criminal
case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and
section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that
duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain
exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or
at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the
prosecution to establish facts which are “especially”
within the knowledge of the accused and which he
could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The
word “especially” stresses that. It means facts that are
pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If
the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would
lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder
case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he
did not commit the murder because who could know
better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident
that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council
has twice refused to construe this section, as
reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to
mean that the burden lies on an accused person to
show that he did not commit the crime for which he is
tried. These cases are Attygalle v. Emperor and
Seneviratne v. R.

Illustration (b) to section 106 has obvious reference to
a very special type of case, namely to offences under
sections 112 and 113 of the Indian Railways Act for
travelling or attempting to travel without a pass or ticket or
with an insufficient pass, etc. Now if a passenger is seen in
3 (1956) SCR page 199
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a railway carriage, or at the ticket barrier, and is unable to
produce a ticket or explain his presence, it would obviously
be impossible in most cases for the railway to prove, or
even with due diligence to find out, where he came from
and where he is going and whether or not he purchased a
ticket. On the other hand, it would be comparatively simple
for the passenger either to produce his pass or ticket or, in
the case of loss or of some other valid explanation, to set it
out; and so far as proof is concerned, it would be easier for
him to prove the substance of his explanation than for the
State to establish its falsity.

We recognise that an illustration does not exhaust the
full content of the section which it illustrates but equally it
can neither curtail nor expand its ambit; and if knowledge
of certain facts is as much available to the prosecution,
should it choose to exercise due diligence, as to the
accused, the facts cannot be said to be “especially” within
the knowledge of the accused. This is a section which must
be considered in a commonsense way; and the balance of
convenience and the disproportion of the labour that would
be involved in finding out and proving certain facts
balanced against the triviality of the issue at stake and the
ease with which the accused could prove them, are all
matters that must be taken into consideration. The section
cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of
law that, save in a very exceptional class of case, the
burden is on the prosecution and never shifts.”
(emphasis added)

20. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases

where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which

a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain

other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When

the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said

other facts, the Court can always draw an appropriate inference.

21. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused

fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on
15

him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may

provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case

governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which

is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the

failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the

Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity

of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.

22. As we have already held in this case, the circumstances established

by the prosecution do not lead to only one possible inference regarding the

guilt of the appellant-accused.

23. Therefore, what survives for consideration is only an opinion of the

medical practitioner who conducted autopsy and gave a report on the

cause of death. As held in the case of Balaji Gunthu Dhule (supra), only

on the basis of post-mortem report, the appellant could not have been

convicted of the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and

consequently for the offence punishable under Section 201 of IPC.

24. Moreover, There is no explanation brought on record by the

prosecution for the delay in registering First Information Report. Though

the post-mortem report was available on 18th November 2011, First

Information Report was belatedly registered on 25th August 2012.
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25. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the guilt of the

accused has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore,

the appeal must succeed and we pass the following order :

(i) The impugned judgment dated 22nd April 2019 of the High Court
is hereby quashed and set aside;

(ii) The appellant stands acquitted from the charges framed against
him for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of
the IPC in case bearing ST No.23/13;

(iii)The appellant shall be forthwith set at liberty and Bail bonds
stand discharged, unless he is required in connection with any
other case.

(iv)Appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.

…………..…………………J
(AJAY RASTOGI)

…………..…………………J
(ABHAY S. OKA)
New Delhi;

September 14, 2021.



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