M/S Cheminova India Ltd. vs The State Of Punjab on 4 August, 2021


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Supreme Court of India

M/S Cheminova India Ltd. vs The State Of Punjab on 4 August, 2021

Author: R. Subhash Reddy

Bench: Navin Sinha, R. Subhash Reddy

[email protected](Crl.)No.4102 of 2020



                                                                       REPORTABLE

                                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                              CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                              CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 749 OF 2021
                            [Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4102 of 2020]


      M/s. Cheminova India Ltd. & Anr.                               …..Appellants

           Versus

      State of Punjab & Anr.                                         …..Respondents



                                         JUDGMENT

R. Subhash Reddy, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This criminal appeal is filed, aggrieved by the order dated

12.05.2020 passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at

Chandigarh. By the aforesaid order, High Court has dismissed the

petition in CRM­M No.1162­2020 (O&M) so far as the appellants are

concerned. Appellants have approached the High Court seeking

quashing of Complaint No.26 dated 25.03.2014 filed by the second

respondent – The Insecticide Inspector, Attari, District Amritsar under

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[email protected](Crl.)No.4102 of 2020

Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18 and 33 punishable under Section 29 of the

Insecticides Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) read with

Rule 27(5) of the Insecticides Rules, 1971.

3. On 10.02.2011, Insecticide Inspector, Attari, District

Amritsar, inspected the premises of firm – M/s. Navneet Singh – on

Railway Road, Attari, District Amritsar where its sole proprietor Sh.

Navneet Singh was present. M/s. Navneet Singh is a dealer of the

first appellant­company which is engaged in the manufacture of

insecticides. On the day of inspection, Inspecting Officer found 60

tins of insecticide, viz., Trizophos 40% E.C. in the premises for sale.

The Inspecting Officer has taken three tins, out of the 60 tins, as test

samples and on the ground that samples sent for analysis were found

to contain active ingredient to the extent of 34.70% only as against the

labelled declaration of 40%, alleging that it amounts to ‘misbranding’

within the meaning of Section 3(k)(i) of the Act and sale of such item is

an offence under Sections 17, 18 and 33 punishable under Section 29

of the Act, the second respondent has lodged the complaint before the

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar in Complaint No.26 of 2014. In

the said complaint, along with the dealer from whom samples were

seized, the first appellant­company, second appellant­Managing

Director and other persons are sought to be prosecuted.

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[email protected](Crl.)No.4102 of 2020

4. The appellants and other accused have approached the High

Court seeking quashing of the complaint mainly on the ground that

the complaint was ex facie barred by limitation and procedure

prescribed under Section 24 was not followed. It was the case of the

appellants that there were abnormal delays in testing the samples, as

such the timelines fixed under Section 24 which are mandatory are

breached, thus, the complaint is fit to be quashed. It was also the

case of the appellants that the necessary undertakings were already

filed indicating the responsible officers of the quality control, as such

the appellants herein are not at all liable for prosecution and

complaint was filed in a casual manner without examining the

necessary aspects. It was also the case of the appellants that the

Magistrate has not followed the procedure prescribed under Section

202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC). The High Court, by

the impugned order, has dismissed the petition so far as the

appellants are concerned while quashing the proceedings so far as the

petitioner no.4 before the High Court, who was Godown Incharge of

the firm.

5. We have heard Sri S. Gurukrishna Kumar, learned senior

counsel assisted by Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja for the appellants and Ms.

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[email protected](Crl.)No.4102 of 2020

Jaspreet Gogia, learned counsel appearing for the State of Punjab, at

length.

6. Sri Gurukrishna Kumar, learned senior counsel for the

appellants, while referring to page 10 of the impugned order, has

submitted that samples were drawn from the dealer on 10.02.2011;

they were sent to the Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Ludhiana on

17.02.2011; and the report of the analysis was received from the

Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Ludhiana on 14.03.2011. Further, it

is submitted that after necessary show cause notice was served on the

appellant­manufacturer and its office bearers, they made a request,

on 15.04.2011 by addressing a letter, for re­analysis of second sample

and after depositing necessary demand draft, second sample was sent

to Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Faridabad for re­analysis on

02.05.2011 and re­analysis report was received belatedly on

09.12.2011 which is clearly in contravention of Section 24(4) of the

Act. Learned counsel, by referring to relevant provisions of the Act,

has submitted that for the offence of misbranding, as alleged in the

complaint, the maximum punishment is imprisonment for a term

which may extend to two years or a fine which shall not be less than

ten thousand rupees or with both. It is further submitted that the

limitation for filing the complaint in such cases is three years from the

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[email protected](Crl.)No.4102 of 2020

date of commission of offence. It is submitted that limitation for

lodging complaint from the date of report of analysis of Insecticide

Testing Laboratory, Ludhiana was only upto 14.03.2014, however, the

complaint was filed on 25.03.2014, which is beyond the period of

limitation. Inspite of the same, the High Court has not considered the

same in proper perspective. Learned counsel, while referring to the

provisions under Section 24 of the Act, has submitted that the

timeline for second report also is fixed, i.e., thirty days from the date

of sending the sample, but, inspite of the same the Central Insecticide

Testing Laboratory, Faridabad has delayed the report by seven

months, which is in clear violation of Section 24(4) of the Act.

Learned counsel also has submitted that while issuing the summons,

the procedure, as contemplated under Section 202, Cr.PC, is not

followed by the Magistrate.

7. On the other hand, Ms. Jaspreet Gogia, learned counsel

appearing for the State, while refuting the various submissions made

by the learned senior counsel for the appellants, has submitted that

though the first report of analysis from the Insecticide Testing

Laboratory, Ludhiana was received on 14.03.2011, the appellants

have made a request for sending the other sample to the Central

Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Faridabad which was duly sent, after

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[email protected](Crl.)No.4102 of 2020

deposit of demand draft, on 02.05.2011 and the re­analysis on the

second sample was received from the Central Insecticide Testing

Laboratory, Faridabad on 09.12.2011. While referring to Section 24(4)

of the Act, learned counsel has submitted that the report on such

second sample shall be the conclusive evidence, as such, it cannot be

said, the complaint is barred by limitation. Further, it is the

submission of the learned counsel that the timelines under Section

24(4) of the Act were followed and the complaint filed is not barred by

limitation and is also not in violation of the procedure contemplated

under Section 202, Cr.PC.

8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we have

perused the impugned order and other material placed on record.

9. In view of the undisputed fact that after drawing the sample

from the dealer on 10.02.2011 report of analysis was received from

the Insecticide Testing Laboratory at Ludhiana on 14.03.2011, we are

of the firm view that the complaint filed is barred by limitation. It is

not in dispute that report from Insecticide Testing Laboratory,

Ludhiana was received by the Inspector on 14.03.2011. Section 29 of

the Act deals with the ‘offences and punishment’. The appellants are

sought to be prosecuted on the ground of misbranding of the

insecticide, i.e., Trizophos 40% E.C. It is the allegation in the

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[email protected](Crl.)No.4102 of 2020

complaint that upon analysis of the sample, same was found to

contain active ingredient to the extent of 34.70% only as against the

labelled declaration of 40%. Thus, it is a case of ‘misbranding’ within

the meaning of Section 3(k)(i) of the Act and selling of such

misbranded item is in violation of Sections 17, 18, and 33 punishable

under Section 29 of the Act. From a reading of Section 29, it is clear

that the maximum punishment for such offence, if it is first offence, is

imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine

which shall not be less than ten thousand rupees which may extend

to fifty thousand rupees, or with both. For a second and subsequent

offence, the punishment is imprisonment for a term which may extend

to three years or with fine which shall not be less than fifteen

thousand rupees which may extend to seventy­five thousand rupees,

or with both. Section 468 of Cr.PC prohibits taking cognizance of an

offence after the lapse of period of limitation. As per sub­section (2)(c)

thereof, the period of limitation is three years, if the offence is

punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not

exceeding three years. Section 469 of Cr.PC deals with the

‘commencement of the period of limitation’. As per the said provision,

the period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence on

the date of offence or where the commission of the offence was not

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[email protected](Crl.)No.4102 of 2020

known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer,

the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such

person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier.

10. In the present case, it is not in dispute, the complainant­2 nd

respondent has received the report of analysis on 14.03.2011 from the

Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Ludhiana and the complaint was

lodged on 25.03.2014 which is beyond a period of three years from

14.03.2011. The only submission of the learned counsel for the State

is that further report from the Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory

was received on 09.12.2011 which is the conclusive evidence of the

facts, as such, the complaint is within the period of limitation. We are

not convinced with such submission made by learned counsel for the

State. When it is clear from the language of Section 469, Cr.PC that

the period of limitation shall commence on the date of offence, there is

no reason to seek computation of limitation only from the date of

receipt of report of the Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory,

Faridabad. As per the procedure prescribed under the Statute, i.e.,

Insecticide Act, 1968 and the rules made thereunder, the Insecticide

Testing Laboratory, Ludhiana was the competent authority to which

the sample was sent on 17.02.2011, after drawing on 10.02.2011, and

the report of analysis was received on 14.03.2011, as such the said

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[email protected](Crl.)No.4102 of 2020

date is said to be the crucial date for commencement of period of

limitation. By virtue of the said report received on 14.03.2011 which

states that the active ingredient of the sample was only to the extent

34.70% as against the labelled declaration of 40%, it is clear that it is

the date of offence allegedly committed by the accused. Merely

because a further request is made for sending the sample to the

Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory, as contemplated under Section

24(4) of the Act, which report was received on 09.12.2011, receipt of

such analysis report on 09.12.2011 cannot be the basis for

commencement of limitation. The report of analysis received from the

Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Ludhiana on 14.03.2011 itself

indicates misbranding, as stated in the complaint, thus, the period of

limitation within the meaning of Section 469, Cr.PC commences from

14.03.2011 only. In that view of the matter, we are clearly of the view

that the complaint filed is barred by limitation and allowing the

proceedings to go on, on such complaint, which is ex facie barred by

limitation is nothing but amounts to abuse of process of law. Though

the learned counsel has also raised other grounds in support of

quashing, as we are persuaded to accept his submission that

complaint filed is barred by limitation, it is not necessary to deal with

such other grounds raised.

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[email protected](Crl.)No.4102 of 2020

11. For the aforesaid reasons, this criminal appeal is allowed.

The impugned order dated 12.05.2020 passed by the High Court of

Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM­M No.1162­2020 (O&M) is

set aside. Consequently, Complaint No.26 dated 25.03.2014 filed by

the second respondent before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar

stands quashed.

………………………………J.

[Navin Sinha]

………………………………J.

[R. Subhash Reddy]

New Delhi.

August 04, 2021.

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SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 750 OF 2021
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.4144 OF 2020)

M/s. Cheminova India Limited & Anr. …Appellant(s)

vs.

             State of Punjab & Ors.                                  ...Respondent(s)



                                        J U D G M E N T


             R.SUBHASH REDDY,J.

             1.        Leave granted.

             2.        This       Criminal        Appeal      is     filed        by       the

Petitioners / Accused nos. 3 and 4 in CRM-M-12082-

2016 (O & M) before the High Court of Punjab &

Haryana at Chandigarh, aggrieved by the Order dated

12.05.2020. By the aforesaid order, the Petitioners’

application of quashing of Complaint No. 313 dated

19.08.2015, filed by the Respondent No.2 – The

1
SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020

Quality Control Inspector, Bhikhiwind, District Tarn

Taran, Punjab for offences under Sections 3(k)(i),

17, 18 and 33, punishable under Section 29 of the

Insecticides Act, 1968 (for short, “the Act”), was

dismissed. The petition was allowed by the High Court

for other accused, who was working as Godown

Incharge, and quashed the proceedings.

3. The 1st Appellant is a Company, having its office

in Mumbai, which is engaged in manufacturing of

insecticides. The 2nd Appellant was the Ex-Managing

Director of the Company. On 31.12.2013, Quality

Control Inspector, Bhikhiwind, District Tarn Taran,

Punjab inspected the premises of M/s. Dhillon Kheti

Store in the presence of its sole Proprietor, Shri

Nishan Singh. The said Nishan Singh was the

authorised dealer for 1st Appellant – Company, to sell

its insecticides. At the time of inspection, the

inspecting officer found six boxes containing 25

packets each, of Piroxofop Propanyl (Clodinafop

Propargyl 15% WP), with each packet weighing 160

grams, stocked in the premises. From the abovesaid

stock, samples were drawn and one of the samples was

sent to Senior Analyst, Insecticide Testing

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SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020

Laboratory, Amritsar. When the report dated

15.01.2014 was received, active ingredient of

Piroxofop Propanyl was found only to the extent of

11.72% as against the labelled declaration of 15%. A

copy of the report was sent to the dealer at Amritsar

along with a Show Cause Notice. On production of copy

of the invoice by the dealer, indicating that he had

purchased the insecticides in question from the 1 st

Appellant – Company, Show Cause Notice was also

issued to the 1st Appellant – Company, which is having

its manufacturing unit in Bharuch, Gujarat and to

other responsible officers of the Company. On receipt

of the report, the 2nd Appellant herein, on behalf of

the Company, also made a request to send another

sample to Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory at

Faridabad vide letter dated 27.03.2014 and after

depositing necessary charges, another sample was sent

to Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory, which has

reported that the sample was misbranded as the same

was found to contain 10.09% of active ingredient only

as against 15%, as labelled on the packet. After

obtaining necessary sanction from the competent

authority, a complaint was lodged before the Judicial

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SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020

Magistrate to prosecute the appellants and other

accused for offences under Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18

and 33, punishable under Section 29 of the Act.

4. The appellants and other accused approached the

High Court, seeking quashing of the said complaint on

various grounds. By impugned order, High Court has

dismissed the petition, so far as appellants are

concerned, and allowed the application for the Godown

Watchman.

5. Heard Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior

Counsel, appearing for the Appellants and Ms.

Jaspreet Gogia, learned Counsel appearing for the

Respondents.

6. Learned Counsel for the appellants by referring

to Section 33 of the Act has submitted that

appellants have already filed an undertaking dated

22.01.2013 before the respondents, nominating the

incharge and responsible officers of the Company to

maintain quality of the pesticides manufactured by

the Company along with the resolution of the

Company’s meeting held on 28.12.2012. Learned Counsel

has submitted that by making vague and bald

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SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020

allegations, the appellants, who were the Company and

the Managing Director, are also sought to be

prosecuted.

6(a). It is submitted that unless there is a clear

and categorical averment in the complaint, indicating

the role played by the appellants, there cannot be

any vicarious liability on the 1st Appellant – Company

and the 2nd Appellant–Managing Director for commission

of the alleged offence. In support of his arguments,

learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the

judgment of this Court in the case of Managing

Director, Castrol India Limited vs. State of

Karnataka & Anr.1, and also another judgment of this

Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Jatia vs. State of

NCT of Delhi2.

6(b). It is also further contended by the learned

Counsel that before taking cognizance of the offence

on the complaint, learned Magistrate has not followed

the procedure, contemplated under Section 24 (4) of

the Act and Section 202 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. It is submitted that though, the

1
2018 (17) SCC 275

2
2019 (17) SCC 193

5
SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020

appellants are not residing within the jurisdiction

of the Magistrate, without making proper inquiry and

ordering investigation, cognizance of the offence is

taken. Further, it is submitted that the prosecution

against the appellants, is nothing but abuse of the

process of law. The High Court has not considered

various grounds raised by the appellants in proper

perspective and dismissed their application for

quashing the complaint. In support of his argument

that the Magistrate has not followed the procedure

under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the

judgment of this Court in Re: Expeditious Trial of

Cases under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881 (Suo Motu

Writ Petition (Crl.) No.2 of 2020)3.

7. On the other hand, learned Counsel, appearing for

the Respondents, has submitted that the High Court

has considered all the grounds raised by the

petitioners and rejected the petition to quash the

proceedings. It is submitted that the 2nd Appellant,

being the Managing Director of the 1st Appellant –

Company, which is the manufacturer of the product in

3
2021 SCC ONLINE SC 325

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SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020

question, was rightly prosecuted by the 2nd Respondent

– Quality Control Inspector, Bhikhiwind, District

Tarn Taran, Punjab. Learned Counsel has submitted

that there is no violation of provision under Section

24 (4) of the Act and Section 202 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure and there are no grounds to

interfere with the order of the High Court. It is

submitted that the Appellant No.2 was the Managing

Director of the Company at the relevant point of

time, as such, he is overall responsible person for

quality control of the products of the Company, as

such, he is also liable for prosecution.

8. Having heard the learned Counsels on both sides,

we have perused the impugned Order and other material

placed on record.

9. Section 33 of the Act deals with ‘offences by

companies’. A reading of Section 33(1) of the Act,

makes it clear that whenever an offence under this

Act has been committed by a company, every person who

at the time the offence was committed, was in charge

of, or was responsible to the company for the conduct

of the business of, the company, as well as the

company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence

7
SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020

and shall be liable to be proceeded against and

punished accordingly. In the case on hand, it is not

in dispute that on behalf of the 1 st Appellant –

Company, 2nd Appellant – Managing Director has

furnished an undertaking dated 22.01.2013, indicating

that Shri Madhukar R. Gite, Manager of the Company,

has been nominated in the resolution passed by the

Company on 28.12.2012 to be in charge of and

responsible to the said Company, to maintain the

quality of the pesticides manufactured by the said

Company and he was authorized to exercise all such

powers and to take all such steps, as may be

necessary or expedient to prevent the commission of

any offence under the Act. Filing of such undertaking

with the respondent is not disputed. Even, at Para

5.10 in the counter affidavit filed before this

Court, it is pleaded by the Respondents that by

appointing persons responsible for affairs of the

Company, quality control, etc., 2nd Appellant –

Managing Director cannot escape his liability from

offences committed by 1st Appellant – Company. In view

of the specific provision in the Act dealing with the

offences by companies, which fixes the responsibility

8
SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020

and the responsible person of the Company for conduct

of its business, by making bald and vague

allegations, 2nd Appellant – Managing Director cannot

be prosecuted on vague allegation that he being the

Managing Director of the 1st Appellant – Company, is

overall responsible person for the conduct of the

business of the Company and of quality control, etc.

In the instant case, the Company has passed a

resolution, fixing responsibility of one of the

Managers namely Mr. Madhukar R. Gite by way of a

resolution and the same was furnished to the

respondents by the 2nd Appellant in shape of an

undertaking on 22.01.2013. When furnishing of such

undertaking fixing the responsibility of the quality

control of the products is not in dispute, there is

no reason or justification for prosecuting the 2nd

Appellant – Managing Director, on the vague and

spacious plea that he was the Managing Director of

the Company at the relevant time. A reading of

Section 33 of the Act also makes it clear that only

responsible person of the Company, as well as the

Company alone shall be deemed to be guilty of the

offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against.

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SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020

Though, the Managing Director is overall incharge of

the affairs of the company, whether such officer is

to be prosecuted or not, depends on the facts and

circumstances of each case and the relevant

provisions of law. Having regard to specific

provision under Section 33 of the Act, and the

undertaking filed in the present case, respondent

cannot prosecute the 2nd Appellant herein. Thus, we

find force in the contention of Mr. Sidharth Luthra,

learned Senior Counsel, that allowing the prosecution

against 2nd Appellant – Managing Director is nothing

but, abuse of the process of law. At the same time,

we do not find any ground at this stage to quash the

proceedings against the 1st Appellant – Company.

10. Further, from the averments in the counter

affidavit filed on behalf of Respondents 1 & 2 and

other material placed on record, we are of the view

that no case is made out to quash the proceedings at

this stage, by accepting the plea of the appellants

that the procedure contemplated under Section 24 (4)

of the Act and Section 202 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, is not followed. With regard to the

procedure under Section 24 (4) of the Act, we are

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SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020

satisfied that after the 1st Appellant – Company has

deposited necessary Demand Draft for sending 2nd

sample to the Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory,

steps were taken promptly and report was also sent by

the Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory within the

prescribed period of 30 days. Similarly, with regard

to the procedure contemplated under Section 202 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, the same is to be

viewed, keeping in mind that the complainant is a

public servant who has filed the complaint in

discharge of his official duty. The legislature in

its wisdom has itself placed the public servant on a

different pedestal, as would be evident from a

perusal of proviso to Section 200 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure. Object of holding an inquiry /

investigation before taking cognizance, in cases

where accused resides outside the territorial

jurisdiction of such Magistrate, is to ensure that

innocents are not harassed unnecessarily. By virtue

of proviso to Section 200 of Code of Criminal

Procedure, the Magistrate, while taking cognizance,

need not record statement of such public servant, who

has filed the complaint in discharge of his official

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SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020

duty. Further, by virtue of Section 293 of Code of

Criminal Procedure, report of the Government

Scientific Expert is, per se, admissible in evidence.

The Code of Criminal Procedure itself provides for

exemption from examination of such witnesses, when

the complaint is filed by a public servant. In the

present case, 2nd Respondent / Public Servant, in

exercise of powers under provisions of the

Insecticides Act, 1968, has filed complaint,

enclosing several documents including reports of the

Government Laboratories, it is always open for the

Magistrate to issue process on such complaint which

is supported by documents. In any event, we do not

find any merit in the submissions of the learned

Counsel that proceedings are to be quashed only on

the ground that, the Magistrate has taken cognizance

without conducting inquiry and ordering

investigation. In absence of showing any prejudice

caused to the appellant at this stage, the same is no

ground to quash the proceedings in exercise of power

under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

11. As all other nominated / responsible persons of

the Company are already accused in the Complaint, we

12
SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020

are of the view that there is no basis to proceed

against the 2nd Appellant – Managing Director to

prosecute him for the alleged offences. The judgment

of this Court relied on by Mr. Sidharth Luthra,

learned Senior Counsel, which is with reference to

provisions under Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in

Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 of

N.I. Act, 1881 (Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No.2 of

2020)3, is also of not much help to the Appellants at

this stage, having regard to the facts and

circumstances of the present case.

12. For the aforesaid reasons this Criminal Appeal is

partly allowed, so far as the Appellant No.2 –

Managing Director is concerned and the impugned Order

of the High Court dated 12.05.2020, passed by the

High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM-

M-12082-2016 (O & M), is set aside. Consequently,

Complaint No. 313 dated 19.08.2015, filed by the 2nd

Respondent – Quality Control Inspector, Bhikhiwind

District Tarn Taran, Punjab, pending before the

learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patti stands

quashed qua the Appellant No.2 namely Mr. Pramod N.

Karlekar / Accused No.4. Further, it is made clear

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SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020

that the observations and findings recorded in this

order are made only for the purpose of disposal of

this Appeal arising out of quash petition and it is

open for the Trial Court to record its own findings,

based on the evidence on record, and take such other

steps, in accordance with law.

……………………………………………………………………J
(NAVIN SINHA)

……………………………………………………………………J
(R.SUBHASH REDDY)

NEW DELHI;

August 4, 2021

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