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Supreme Court of India
Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran … vs M/S Navigant Technologies Pvt. … on 2 March, 2021
Author: Hon’Ble Ms. Malhotra
Bench: Hon’Ble Ms. Malhotra, Ajay Rastogi
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 791 OF 2021 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10372 / 2020) DAKSHIN HARYANA BIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LTD. … APPELLANT Versus M/S NAVIGANT TECHNOLOGIES PVT. LTD. … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T
INDU MALHOTRA, J.
1. The present Civil Appeal arises from a Petition filed under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the Appellant-Bijli Vitrain Nigam to
challenge the arbitral award dated 27.04.2018 passed by a three-member
tribunal (2:1) in favour of the respondent company.
2. The issue which has arisen for our consideration is as to whether the period
of limitation for filing the Petition under Section 34 would commence from the
date on which the draft award dated 27.04.2018 was circulated to the parties, or
the date on which the signed copy of the award was provided.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
(i) The background facts emanate from a Service Level Agreement
dated 02.05.2011 executed by the appellant-corporation in favour of
the Respondent-company providing call centre services.
Clause 13 of the Agreement provided for resolution of disputes
through arbitration by a three-member tribunal, under the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Clause 13 reads as :
All matter question, disputes, differences and/or claims arising out of and/or
concerning and/or in connection and/or in consequences or relating to the
Contract whether or not obligations of either or both parties under the
Contract be subsisting at the time of such dispute and whether or not the
contract has been terminated or purported to be terminated or completed,
shall be referred to the arbitration which shall be conducted by three
arbitrators, one each to be nominated by the Service Provider and the Nigam
(Arbitrator to be approved by the MD DHBVNL or authority of the Nigam) and
the third to be named by the president of the institution of Engineers, India. If
either of the parties fails to appoint its arbitrator within thirty (30) days after
receipt of a notice from the other party invoking the arbitration clause, the
president of the institution of Engineers, India, shall have the power at the
request of either of the parties, to appoint the arbitrator. A certified copy of the
order of the institution of engineers (India) making such an appointment will
be furnished to each of the parties.
The decision of the majority of the arbitrators shall be final and binding upon
the parties. The parties to the contract agree that the cost of arbitration shall
be as per instructions to the Nigam issued/prevalent on the date of
appointment of arbitral tribunal. The arbitrators may, from time to time, with
the consent of the parties enlarge the time for making the award. In the event
of any of the aforesaid arbitrators dying, neglecting, resigning or being usable
to act for any reason, it will be lawful for the party concerned to nominate
another arbitrator in place of the outgoing arbitrator.
The arbitrator shall have full powers to review and/or revise any decision,
opinion, direction, certification or valuation of the Engineer in consonance
with the Contract, and neither party shall be limited in the proceedings before
such arbitrators to the evidence or arguments put before the engineer for the
purpose of obtaining the said decision.
Subject to aforementioned provisions, the provisions of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Rules there under any statutory modifications
thereof for the time being enforce, shall be deemed to apply to the Arbitration
proceedings under the clause.”
(ii) On 16.10.2014, the appellant corporation terminated the Service
Level Agreement, which led to disputes between the parties. The
disputes were referred to arbitration by a three-member tribunal.
(iii) The arbitral tribunal orally pronounced the award [2:1] on
27.04.2018, whereby the claims of the respondent company were
allowed. The parties were informed that the third arbitrator had
disagreed with the view taken by the majority of arbitrators, and would
be rendering his separate opinion. A copy of the draft award was
provided to the parties to point out any computation, clerical or
typographical errors in the award on the next date of hearing.
The proceedings of the tribunal dated 27.04.2018 read as under :
Sh. Nishant Shrivastava, Advocate for the claimant with Sh. Ankur Bhatia,
M.D. of the Claimant.
Sh. Ashish Goyal, Advocate and Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, JE for the respondent.
Vide separately recorded award dated today, claims of the claimant have
been allowed with cost. Dr. Shiva Sharma has agreed with same, whereas
Sh. D.S. Yadav has disagreed. He shall file his separate award. Copies free
of costs, of the award have been supplied to both the Ld. Counsels for the
parties. To come up on 12.05.2017, at 4:30 p.m. for award of Sh. D.S. Yadav,
Arbitrator. On that date, parties are also required to show any computation
error, any clerical or typographical error or any other error of similar nature
occurred in the award if any.
Vinod Jain, D&S Judge(retd.) Presiding Arbitrator
Sh. Shiva Sharma, D&S Judge (retd.)
Sh.D.S. Yadav, Director, DHBVN (retd.)”
The matter was next posted to 12.05.2018.
(iv) On 12.05.2018, a copy of the dissenting opinion was provided by
the third arbitrator to the parties (even though the opinion was dated
27.04.2018). The matter was then posted to 19.05.2018, for the parties
to point out any typographical or clerical mistakes in the dissenting
opinion delivered by the third arbitrator.
The order dated 12.05.2018 reads as :
Sh. Nishant Shrivastava, Advocate for the claimant
Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, JE for the respondent.
Arbitrator Sh. D.S. Yadav has filed his own dissenting Award.
Copies free of cost have been supplied to both the parties to these
arbitration proceedings. Both the parties have not pointed out any
computation or clerical error etc. in the award dated 27.04.2018.
Now to come up on 19.05.2018 at the same venue to point out any
typographical or clerical mistakes if any in the award of today given by Sh.
D.S. Yadav, Arbitrator. Venue the same. Also on that date original record
should be handed over to the Ld. Counsel for the claimant for safe custody
with pen drives of the record to the other party as well as to the Arbitrators.”
(v) On 19.05.2018, the tribunal recorded that both the parties had
not filed any application to point out any clerical or typographical
mistakes in the award, or dissenting opinion. On this date, the signed
copy of the arbitral award was provided to both the parties, and the
proceedings were terminated. The proceedings of 19.05.2018 read as :
Sh. Nishant Shrivastava, Advocate for the claimant
Sh. Ashish Goyal, Advocate with Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, JE for the respondent.
Original record has been handed over to Sh. Nishant Shrivastava, Advocate
for its safe custody with him and for its production before the appropriate
authority in case of need. Pen drives of the record have been provided to
both the counsels as well as to the arbitrators. Record is comprised of two
files. First file of pleadings is comprised of 270 pages and second file of
awards, evidence, zimini orders and misc. papers is comprised of 596 pages.
Awards (signed copies) have also been provided to Ld. Counsel for
both the parties free of cost. Both the parties also not filed any applications
to point out any clerical or typographical mistakes in the awards.
Proceedings now come to an end, so are hereby terminated.”
(vi) The Appellant-corporation filed its Objections under Section 34
on 10.09.2018 before the Ld. Civil Court, Hisar, Haryana vide
Arbitration Petition No. 316/2018 to challenge the award dated
27.04.2018, along with an Application for condonation of delay.
It was submitted by the appellant corporation that the objections
were filed within the period prescribed by Section 34(3) i.e. within 3
months and 30 days from the date of receipt of the signed award on
(vii) The Civil Court dismissed the Application for condonation of
delay vide Order dated 14.02.2019. It was held that the Appellant had
received the majority award on 27.04.2018. Thus, the period of
limitation starts running from the same date. Accordingly, the period of
limitation of three months starts from 27.04.2018 i.e. the date on which
the Appellant received the arbitral award. The proviso to Section 34(3)
provides that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented
from sufficient cause from making the application within 3 months, it
may entertain the application within a further period of 30 days. In the
present case, the application u/S. 34 was filed even after the expiry of
the further period of 30 days. Merely because the dissenting opinion
was erroneously styled as an award by the minority arbitrator, it cannot
be said that the dissenting opinion attains the status of an award.
Consequently, the objections were dismissed solely on the ground of
(viii) The appellant corporation filed Appeal No. 1954/2019 (O&M)
under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act before the High Court.
The High Court vide the impugned Order dated 11.12.2019
affirmed the Order passed by the Civil Court. It was held that a reading
of Section 31 clearly reflects that once an award is signed and
communicated by the majority of arbitrators, the same would constitute
an “award”. The signed copy of the majority award i.e. signed by two of
the three arbitrators was received on 27.04.2018, and u/S. 34(3), the
objections had to be filed within 3 months, which would expire on
27.07.2018. Even if the benefit of 30 days had been granted to the
Appellants, the objections ought to have been filed by 26.08.2018,
whereas the objections had been filed on 10.09.2018. There was no
infirmity in the judgment of the Civil Court, and accordingly, the Appeal
(ix) Aggrieved by the rejection of the objections under Section 34 on
the ground of delay, the appellant corporation has filed the present
3. Submissions of the parties
(i) The appellant corporation inter alia contended that its objections
had been erroneously dismissed by the Additional Civil Judge, as well
as the High Court on the sole ground of limitation, and not on merits. It
was submitted that reference to the ‘arbitral award’ in the Arbitration Act
includes both the majority award as well as the minority opinion.
Section 31(1) of the Act provides that all the members of the
tribunal shall sign the award. Section 31(2) which permits an award to
be rendered so long as it is signed by the majority of the members, and
reasons for omission of the signature of the third arbitrator is
mentioned, applies only in the case of a unanimous award. Section
31(2) has no application when there is dissenting view rendered by one
of the arbitrators.
Section 34 of the Act provides for objections to be filed against
the arbitral award, and not the majority award alone. Consequently, the
time limit to file objections against an award under Section 34(3) of the
Act, does not relate to only the majority award, but to the arbitral award,
which includes the opinion of the dissenting member of the tribunal.
It was contended that if the majority award was taken to mean
the arbitral award, the dissenting opinion of the minority would have no
relevance. Such a view would cause grave prejudice to the award
It was further submitted that even though the award of the
majority was pronounced on 27.04.2018, the tribunal posted the matter
on 12.05.2018 to enable the parties to point out any correction, or any
typographical or clerical error in the award. On 12.05.2018, the
dissenting opinion was pronounced, and a copy was provided to the
parties. The matter was next posted on 19.05.2018, to consider any
application for correction in the opinion of the minority. Since no
application for correction of the award, or the minority opinion, was filed
by the parties, the tribunal terminated the proceedings.
It was further submitted that the dissenting opinion has been
held to be the correct view by the Courts in various cases. Reliance
was placed on the judgment of this Court in Ssangyong Engineering
and Construction Co. ltd. v. NHAI.,1 wherein the dissenting opinion
was upheld as being the correct view, and was affirmed. Reference
was made to the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Axios
Navigation v. Indian Oil Corporation,2 wherein it was held that the
view of the minority was relevant for the adjudication of objections
under Section 34 of the Act.
(ii) On the other hand, the Respondents contended that the
objections filed by the appellant corporation under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act are barred by limitation, and ought to be dismissed as
1 2019 (15) SCC 131.
2 2012 SCC Online Bom 4.
such. The contention of the Respondent is that since the majority
award was pronounced on 27.04.2018, the limitation period applicable
under Section 34(3) would commence from this date.
The Respondent placed reliance on Section 34(3) of the Act to
submit that a party may file objections to the award within a period of
three months from the date of receipt of the award. On sufficient cause
being shown to the satisfaction of the Court, the three months period
could be extended by an additional period of thirty days. The
Respondent submitted that the time for filing objections was available
till 26.07.2018, or if sufficient cause was made out, an additional period
of 30 days’ which expired on 26.08.2018.
The dissenting opinion of the minority member was not an award
for the purposes of computing the limitation period prescribed under
sub-section (3) of Section 34.
Section 29(1) of the Act contemplates that the decision of the
majority of members of the tribunal, is the arbitral award. Reliance was
placed on Section 31(2) of the Act which provides that the signature of
all the members of the tribunal was not required, so long as the award
was signed by a majority of the members, and reasons for omission of
the signature of the third arbitrator were recorded in the award.
The opinion of the minority was only a view, and could not be
enforced as an award. It could not be considered to be the arbitral
award for the purpose of computing limitation under Section 34(3) of
Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Delhi and Bombay
High Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Acome and Ors.3, Axion
Navigation v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.,4 and Oriental insurance
Co. v. Air India Ltd.,5 wherein it was held that the limitation period
under Section 34(3) of the Act shall commence from the date when the
award is passed.
4. Discussion & Analysis
We have heard the Ld. counsel for the parties. In order to appreciate the rival
contentions of the parties, we will first examine the scheme of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.
(i) Section 2 (1)(c) of the 1996 Act defines “arbitral award” to
include an interim award. The phrase “arbitral award” has been used in
several provisions of the 1996 Act.
The statute recognises only one arbitral award being passed by
an arbitral tribunal, which may either be a unanimous award, or an
3 AIR 2009 Delhi 102.
4 (2012) 114 (1) Bom LR 392.
5 (2019) SCC Online Del 11634.
award passed by a majority in the case of a panel of members. An
award is a binding decision made by the arbitrator/s on all the issues
referred for adjudication. The award contains the reasons assigned by
the tribunal on the adjudication of the rights and obligations of the
parties arising from the underlying commercial contract. The award
must be one which decides all the issues referred for arbitration. The
view of a dissenting arbitrator is not an award, but his opinion.
However, a party aggrieved by the award, may draw support from the
reasoning and findings assigned in the dissenting opinion.
(ii) The phrase ‘arbitral tribunal’ has been defined by Section 2(1)(d)
to mean a sole arbitrator, or a panel of arbitrators.
(iii) Chapter VI of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act provides the
procedure for making of an arbitral award, and termination of arbitral
Sections 28 to 31 relate to the procedure for making the award.
Section 28 provides the rules applicable for the determination of a
dispute by arbitration.
(iv) Section 29 of the 1996 Act deals with decision making by a panel
of arbitrators. Section 29 reads as :
“29. Decision making by a panel of arbitrators.- (1) Unless otherwise agreed by
the parties, in arbitral proceedings with more than one arbitrator, any decision of the
arbitral tribunal shall be made by a majority of all its members.
(2) Notwithstanding sub-section (1), if authorised by the parties or all the members of
the arbitral tribunal, questions of procedure may be decided by the presiding
Sub-section (1) provides that unless the parties agree otherwise,
in arbitral proceedings with more than one arbitrator, “any decision of
the arbitral tribunal shall be made by a majority of all its members”.
An “arbitral award” is the decision made by the majority
members of an arbitral tribunal, which is final and binding on the
Section 35 provides that an arbitral award shall be “final and
binding” on the parties and persons claiming under them. A dissenting
opinion does not determine the rights or liabilities of the parties which
are enforceable under Section 36 of the Act.
(v) The reference to the phrase “arbitral award” in Sections 34 and
36 refers to the decision of the majority of the members of the arbitral
tribunal. A party cannot file a petition u/S. 34 for setting aside, or u/S.
36 for enforcement of a dissenting opinion. What is capable of being
set aside u/S. 34 is the “arbitral award” i.e. the decision reached by the
majority of members of the tribunal. Similarly, u/S. 36 what can be
enforced is the “arbitral award” passed by the majority of the members.
(vi) Section 29A was inserted by the 2015 Amendment Act. Under
sub-section (1), the arbitral tribunal [other than in an international
commercial arbitration] is mandated by statute to make the arbitral
award within a period of 12 months’ from the date of completion of
pleadings, as provided by sub-section (4) of Section 23. Section 29A(4)
provides that the “mandate” of the arbitrator/s shall terminate if the
award is not made “within” the period specified in sub-section (1), or
the extended period under sub-section (3). Therefore, by prescription of
law, the mandate of the arbitrator/s would terminate if the time limits are
(vii) Legal requirement of signing the award
The legal requirement of signing the arbitral award by a sole
arbitrator, or the members of a tribunal is found in Section 31 of the
1996 Act, which provides the form and content of an arbitral award.
Section 31 provides that :
“31. Form and contents of arbitral award.- (1) An arbitral award shall be made in
writing and shall be signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), in arbitral proceedings with more than
one arbitrator, the signatures of the majority of all the members of the arbitral
tribunal shall be sufficient so long as the reason for any omitted signature is
(4) The arbitral award shall state its date and the place of arbitration as
determined in accordance with section 20 and the award shall be deemed to
have been made at that place.
(5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each
….. ” (emphasis supplied) 14 (viii) Section 31 (1) is couched in mandatory terms, and provides that
an arbitral award shall be made in writing and signed by all the
members of the arbitral tribunal. If the arbitral tribunal comprises of
more than one arbitrator, the award is made when the arbitrators acting
together finally express their decision in writing, and is authenticated by
their signatures6 An award takes legal effect only after it is signed by
the arbitrators, which gives it authentication. There can be no finality of
the award, except after it is signed, since signing of the award gives
legal effect and validity to it. The making and delivery of the award are
different stages of an arbitration proceeding. An award is made when it
is authenticated by the person who makes it.
The statute makes it obligatory for each of the members of the
tribunal to sign the award, to make it a valid award. The usage of the
term “shall” makes it a mandatory requirement. It is not merely a
ministerial act, or an empty formality which can be dispensed with.
(ix) Sub-section (1) of Section 31 read with sub-section (4) makes it
clear that the Act contemplates a single date on which the arbitral
award is passed i.e. the date on which the signed copy of the award is
delivered to the parties. Section 31 (5) enjoins upon the arbitrator /
tribunal to provide the signed copy of the arbitral award to the parties.
The receipt of a signed copy of the award is the date from which the
6 Malhotra’s Commentary on the Law of Arbitration, Wolters Kluwer, 4th Ed., Vol.1, p.794.
period of limitation for filing objections u/S. 34 would commence. This
would be evident from the language of sub-section (3) of Section 34(3)
which reads :
“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have
elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received
the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the
date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by
sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three
months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but
(x) In Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors 7, a
three-judge bench of this Court held that the period of limitation for
filing an application u/S. 34 would commence only after a valid delivery
of the award takes place u/S. 31(5) of the Act. In para 8, it was held as
“8. The delivery of an arbitral award under sub-section (5) of Section 31 is not a
matter of mere formality. It is a matter of substance. It is only after the stage
under Section 31 has passed that the stage of termination of arbitral proceedings
within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act arises. The delivery of arbitral award
to the party, to be effective, has to be ‘received’ by the party. This delivery by the
Arbitral Tribunal and receipt by the party of the award sets in motion several
periods of limitation such as an application for correction and interpretation of an
award within 30 days under Section 33(1), an application for making an
additional award under Section 33(4) and an application for setting aside an
award under Section 34(3) and so on. As this delivery of the copy of award has
the effect of conferring certain rights on the party as also bringing to an end the
right to exercise those rights on expiry of the prescribed period of limitation which
would be calculated from that date, the delivery of the copy of award by the
Tribunal and the receipt thereof by each party constitutes an important stage in
the arbitral proceedings.”
7 (2005) 4 SCC 239.
(xi) The judgment in Tecco Trichy Engineers (supra) was followed
in State of Maharashtra v. Ark Builders,8 wherein this Court held that
Section 31(1) obliges the members of the arbitral tribunal to make the
award in writing and sign it. The legal requirement under sub-section
(5) of Section 31 is the delivery of a copy of the award signed by the
members of the arbitral tribunal / arbitrator, and not any copy of the
award. On a harmonious construction of Section 31(5) read with
Section 34(3), the period of limitation prescribed for filing objections
would commence only from the date when the signed copy of the
award is delivered to the party making the application for setting aside
the award. If the law prescribes that a copy of the award is to be
communicated, delivered, despatched, forwarded, rendered, or sent to
the parties concerned in a particular way, and since the law sets a
period of limitation for challenging the award in question by the
aggrieved party, then the period of limitation can only commence from
the date on which the award was received by the concerned party in
the manner prescribed by law.
The judgment in Tecco Trichy has been recently followed in
Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel.9
8 (2011) 4 SCC 616
9 (2018) 15 SCC 178
(xii) In State of Himachal Pradesh v Himachal Techno
Engineers,10 this Court held that if one of the parties to the arbitration
is Government, or a statutory body, which has notified holidays, and if
the award was delivered to a beldar or a watchman on a holiday or
non-working day, it cannot be considered to be “receipt of the award”
by the party concerned for the purposes of Section 31(5) of the Act.
When the award is delivered, or deposited, or left in the office of a party
on a non-working day, the date of physical delivery is not the date of
“receipt” of the award by that party. For the purposes of Section 31(5),
the date of receipt will have to be the next working day.
(xiii) Section 32 provides that the arbitral proceedings shall be
terminated after the final award is passed. With the termination of the
arbitral proceedings, the mandate of the arbitral tribunal terminates,
and the tribunal becomes functus officio.
(xiv) In an arbitral tribunal comprising of a panel of three members, if
one of the members gives a dissenting opinion, it must be delivered
contemporaneously on the same date as the final award, and not on a
subsequent date, as the tribunal becomes functus officio upon the
passing of the final award. The period for rendering the award and
dissenting opinion must be within the period prescribed by Section 29A
of the Act.
10 (2010) 12 SCC 210
(xv) In the treatise on ’International Commercial Arbitration’ authored by
Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, it has been opined that :
“1403.- A dissenting opinion can only be issued when the majority has already
made the decision which constitutes the award. Until then, any document issued
by the minority arbitrator can only be treated as part of the deliberations.
However, once the majority decision has been reached, it is preferable for the
author of the dissenting opinion to communicate a draft to the other arbitrators so
as to enable them to discuss the arguments put forward in it. The award made by
the majority could then be issued after the dissenting opinion, or at least, after
the draft of the dissenting opinion…” 11
(xvi) There is only one date recognised by law i.e. the date on which a
signed copy of the final award is received by the parties, from which the
period of limitation for filing objections would start ticking. There can be
no finality in the award, except after it is signed, because signing of the
award gives legal effect and finality to the award.
(xvii) The date on which the signed award is provided to the parties is
a crucial date in arbitration proceedings under the Indian Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is from this date that: (a) the period of 30
days’ for filing an application under Section 33 for correction and
interpretation of the award, or additional award may be filed; (b) the
arbitral proceedings would terminate as provided by Section 32(1) of
the Act; (c) the period of limitation for filing objections to the award
under Section 34 commences.
11 Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, International Commercial Arbitration, Ed. Emmannuel Gaillard, John Savage,,
p.786 (Kluwer Law International).
(xviii) Section 34 provides recourse for judicial scrutiny of the award by
a Court, upon making an application under sub-sections (2) and (3) for
setting aside the award.
The period of limitation for filing the objections to the award u/S.
34 commences from the date on which the party making the application
has “received” a signed copy of the arbitral award, as required by
Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act.
Section 34(3) provides a specific time limit of three months from
the date of “receipt” of the award, and a further period of thirty days, if
the Court is satisfied that the party was prevented by sufficient cause
from making the application within the said period, but not thereafter.
In Union of India v. Popular Construction,12 this Court held
that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply to
applications filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. It was held
“12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the
crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our
opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of
Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court
could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period
under the proviso, would render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly otiose. No
principle of interpretation would justify such a result.”
12 (2001) 8 SCC 470.
In Simplex Infrastructure v. Union of India,13 this Court held
that the phrase “but not thereafter” provided under Section 34(3) of the
Act makes it evident that the statutory period of limitation for filing an
application for setting aside is three months, which is extendable by
thirty days, if sufficient cause is made out. No further period of time can
be granted for the filing of an application under Section 34.
(xix) If the objections are not filed within the period prescribed by
Section 34, the award holder is entitled to move for enforcement of the
arbitral award as a deemed decree of the Court u/S. 36 of the Act.
This Court in P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar,14 held that :
“32.5. Once the time-limit or extended time-limit for challenging the arbitral
award expires, the period for enforcing the award under Section 36 of the
Arbitration Act commences. This is evident from the phrase “where the time for
making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has
expired”. [“36. Enforcement.—Where the time for making an application to set
aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired, or such application
having been made, it has been refused, the award shall be enforced under the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the same manner as if it were a
decree of the Court.”(emphasis supplied)] There is an integral nexus between
the period prescribed under Section 34(3) to challenge the award and the
commencement of the enforcement period under Section 36 to execute the
36.2. Second, extending Section 17 of the Limitation Act to Section 34 would
do violence to the scheme of the Arbitration Act. As discussed above, Section
36 enables a party to apply for enforcement of award when the period for
challenging an award under Section 34 has expired. However, if Section 17
were to be extended to Section 34, the determination of “time for making an
application to set aside the arbitral award” in Section 36 will become uncertain
and create confusion in the enforcement of award. This runs counter to the
scheme and object of the Arbitration Act.”
(xx) Relevance of a dissenting opinion
13 (2019) 12 SCC 455
14 (2019) 13 SCC 445.
(a) The dissenting opinion of a minority arbitrator can be relied upon
by the party seeking to set aside the award to buttress its submissions
in the proceedings under Section 34.
(b) At the stage of judicial scrutiny by the Court under Section 34,
the Court is not precluded from considering the findings and
conclusions of the dissenting opinion of the minority member of the
(c) In the commentary of ‘Russel on Arbitration’, the relevance of a
dissenting opinion was explained as follows :
“6-058. Dissenting opinions. Any member of the tribunal who does not assent
to an award need not sign it but may set out his own views of the case, either
within the award document or in a separate “dissenting opinion”. The arbitrator
should consider carefully whether there is good reason for expressing his
dissent, because a dissenting opinion may encourage a challenge to the award.
This is for the parties’ information only and does not form part of the award, but it
may be admissible as evidence in relation to the procedural matters in the event
of a challenge or may add weight to the arguments of a party wishing to appeal
against the award.”15
(d) Gary B. Born in his commentary on International Commercial
Arbitration opines that :
“Even absent express authorization in national law or applicable institutional rules
(or otherwise), the right to provide a dissenting or separate opinion is an
appropriate concomitant of the arbitrator’s adjudicative function and the tribunal’s
related obligation to make a reasoned award. Although there are legal systems
where dissenting or separate opinions are either not permitted, or not customary,
these domestic rules have little application in the context of party-nominated co-
arbitrators, and diverse tribunals. Indeed, the right of an arbitrator to deliver a
dissenting opinion is properly considered as an element of his / her adjudicative
15 David St. John Sutton, Judith Gill and Matthew Gearing QC, Russel on Arbitration, 24 th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell), p.
mandate, particularly in circumstances where a reasoned award is required. Only
clear an explicit prohibition should preclude the making and publication to the
parties of a dissenting opinion, which serves an important role in the deliberative
process, and can provide a valuable check on arbitrary or indefensible decision
It is further commented that :
“There is nothing objectionable at all about an arbitrator “systematically drawing
up a dissenting opinion, and insisting that it be communicated to the parties”. If
an arbitrator believes that the tribunal is making a seriously wrong decision,
which cannot fairly be reconciled with the law and the evidentiary record, then
he / she may express that view. There is nothing wrong – and on the contrary,
much that is right – with such a course as part of the adjudicatory process in
which the tribunal’s conclusion is expressed in a reasoned manner. And, if the
arbitrator considers that the award’s conclusions require a “systematic”
discussion, that is also entirely appropriate; indeed, it is implied in the
adjudicative process, and the requirement of a reasoned award.”17
It is further observed that :
“…the very concept of a reasoned award by a multi-member tribunal permits a
statement of different reasons – if different members of the tribunal in fact hold
different views. This is an essential aspect of the process by which the parties
have an opportunity to both, present their case, and hear the reasons for the
tribunal’s decision; not hearing the dissent deprives the parties of an important
aspect of this process.”
(e) In Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd v. NHAI,18
this Court upheld the view taken in the dissenting opinion to be the correct
position in law. In this case, the Court was hearing a special leave
petition from an order passed by a division bench of the Delhi High
Court. This Court noted that:
16 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, Wolters Kluwer, Ed. 2009, Volume II, p. 2466.
17 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, Wolters Kluwer, Ed. 2009, Volume II, p. 2469.
18 (2019) 15 SCC 131.
“12. A Section 34 petition which was filed by the appellant was rejected by the
learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, by a judgment and order dated 9-
8-2016 [Ssangyong Engg. and Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, 2016 SCC OnLine
Del 4536] , in which it was held that a possible view was taken by the majority
arbitrators which, therefore, could not be interfered with, given the parameters of
challenge to arbitral awards. The learned Single Judge also went on to hold that
the New Series published by the Ministry could be applied in the case of the
appellant as the base indices for 2004-2005 under the New Series were
available. Having so held, the learned Single Judge stated that even though the
view expressed in the dissenting award is more appealing, and that he preferred
that view, yet he found that since the majority award is a possible view, the scope
of interference being limited, the Section 34 petition was dismissed. A Section 37
appeal to the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court yielded the same result, by
the impugned judgment dated 3-4-2017 [Ssangyong Engg. and Construction Co.
Ltd. v. NHAI, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7864 : (2017) 240 DLT 711].”
This Court set aside the award. However, in paragraph 77 of the
Judgment, the Court held as under :
“77. The judgments of the Single Judge [Ssangyong Engg. and Construction Co.
Ltd. v. NHAI, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4536] and of the Division Bench [Ssangyong
Engg. and Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7864 : (2017)
240 DLT 711] of the Delhi High Court are set aside. Consequently, the majority
award is also set aside. Under the scheme of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the
disputes that were decided by the majority award would have to be referred
afresh to another arbitration. This would cause considerable delay and be
contrary to one of the important objectives of the 1996 Act, namely, speedy
resolution of disputes by the arbitral process under the Act. Therefore, in order to
do complete justice between the parties, invoking our power under Article 142 of
the Constitution of India, and given the fact that there is a minority award which
awards the appellant its claim based upon the formula mentioned in the
agreement between the parties, we uphold the minority award, and state that it is
this award, together with interest, that will now be executed between the parties.
The minority award, in paras 11 and 12, states as follows:
“11. I therefore award the claim of the claimant in full.
12. Costs — no amount is awarded to the parties. Each party shall bear its own
In Ssangyong, this Court upheld the view taken by the
dissenting arbitrator in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution, in order to do complete justice between the parties. The
reason for doing so is mentioned in paragraph 77 i.e. the considerable
delay which would be caused if another arbitration was to be held. This
Court exercised its extraordinary power in Ssangyong keeping in mind
the facts of the case, and the object of expeditious resolution of
disputes under the Arbitration Act.
(f) In law, where the Court sets aside the award passed by the
majority members of the tribunal, the underlying disputes would require
to be decided afresh in an appropriate proceeding.
Under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the Court may either
dismiss the objections filed, and uphold the award, or set aside the
award if the grounds contained in sub-sections (2) and (2A) are made
out. There is no power to modify an arbitral award.
In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd.,
this Court held as under :
“52. The 1996 Act makes provision for the supervisory role of courts, for the
review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness. Intervention of the court is
envisaged in few circumstances only, like, in case of fraud or bias by the
arbitrators, violation of natural justice, etc. The court cannot correct errors of the
arbitrators. It can only quash the award leaving the parties free to begin the
arbitration again if it is desired. So, the scheme of the provision aims at keeping
the supervisory role of the court at minimum level and this can be justified as
parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the court’s
jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as they prefer the expediency and finality
offered by it.”
5. Applying the law to the facts of the present case, we find from a perusal of the
arbitral proceedings that even though the award was pronounced on 27.04.2018,
the signed copy of the award was provided to the parties only on 19.05.2018.
The procedural orders of the tribunal reveal that on 27.04.2018, only a copy of
the award was provided to the parties to point out any computation error, any
clerical or typographical error, or any other error of similar nature which may have
occurred in the award on the next date. It was also recorded that the third
arbitrator had dissented, and would be delivering his separate opinion. The
proceedings were then posted for 12.05.2018.
On 12.05.2018, the third arbitrator pronounced his dissenting opinion. On that
date, the tribunal posted the matter to 19.05.2018, to enable the parties to point
out any typographical or clerical mistakes in the dissenting opinion, and for
handing over the original record of the proceedings to the parties.
On 19.05.2018, the signed copy of the award and the dissenting opinion,
alongwith the original record, were handed over to the parties, as also to each of
the arbitrators. The tribunal ordered the termination of the proceedings.
6. We are of the considered opinion that the period of limitation for filing
objections would have to be reckoned from the date on which the signed copy of
the award was made available to the parties i.e. on 19.05.2018 in the instant
7. It is the admitted position that the objections were filed within the period of
limitation prescribed by Section 34(3) of the Act, if reckoned from 19.05.2018.
Undisputedly, in the instant case, the objections have been filed within the period
of limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) from the date of receipt of the signed
8. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Appeal deserves to succeed.
The judgment of the Court of the District and Sessions Judge, Hissar, Haryana
dated 14.02.2019, and the impugned order passed by the High Court of Punjab &
Haryana dated 11.12.2019 are accordingly set aside.
9. The Petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 being Arb. Pet. No. 316 of 2018 is restored to the file of the Court of District
and Sessions Judge, Hissar, Haryana to be decided on merits in accordance with
All pending applications are disposed of. Ordered accordingly.
March 2, 2021